Over the last several decades, harmful algal bloom (HAB) events have been observed in more locations than ever before throughout the United States. The 2005 bloom of Alexandrium fundyense was the most widespread and intense in New England waters since a similar event more than three decades ago. In this study, using historical data from 
Introduction
The 2005 bloom of Alexandrium fundyense was the most widespread and intense since a hurricane in 1972 spread the toxic dinoflagellate throughout southern New England waters. Shellfish beds in Massachusetts, Maine, and New Hampshire, as well as 15,000 square miles of federal waters, were closed for more than a month at the peak of the seafood harvesting season. The Massachusetts Division of Marine Fisheries estimated that the total economic impact associated with lost shellfish landings due to the bloom was close to $50 million in the state alone. 1 The US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) declared the event a "commercial fisheries failure," and, for the first time in the region, the governors of Maine and Massachusetts officially declared red tide to be a disaster, clearing the way for fishermen to receive federal emergency assistance.
During the last several decades, harmful algal bloom (HAB) events have been observed in more locations than ever before throughout the United States. Virtually all coastal regions of the United States are now regarded as potentially subject to a wide variety and increased frequency of HABs (Hoagland et al. 2002) . From a management perspective, it is crucial to begin developing an understanding of the scale of the economic costs to society of HAB events. The scale of economic losses can tell us something about the appropriate scale of actions to be taken to prevent or mitigate the losses. At the very least, if one can take some action that removes the threat of a harmful bloom, then no more resources (measured in financial terms) should be spent taking action than the actual economic losses associated with the bloom itself (Hoagland and Scatasta 2006) .
Research on the economic impacts of red tide events is meager. Generally, existing impact assessments of HAB events often are rough estimates based on either limited observation or hypothetical events. Hoagland et al. (2002) compiled and reviewed disparate estimates of the economic effects of HABs for events in the United States during [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] . Their study covered HAB effects of four basic types: public health, commercial fisheries, recreation and tourism, and monitoring and management. To examine the broader market effects of HABs, Wessells et al. (1995) developed a case study of the impacts of a toxic algae bloom contamination event in Prince Edward Island on demand for unaffected shellfish in Montreal. The study showed that there was a reduction in demand for unaffected shellfish following algae contamination due to negative press coverage and resulting consumer perception of product quality.
Along the Maryland coast of Chesapeake Bay, a 1997 bloom of Pfiesteria piscicida resulted in fish kills, primarily of menhaden (Brevoortia tyrannus). Upon learning of the bloom, the Maryland governor expressed concerns about the potential impact on public health, and he reacted by prohibiting commercial and recreational fishing in a number of Chesapeake tributaries. These prohibitions resulted in lost sales to seafood producers in most seafood categories, including those clearly unrelated to the bloom. A study of the economic impacts from this HAB event (Whitehead et al. 2003) concluded that a public announcement of a fish kill can lead to contractions in the demand for seafood. In the month following the Pfiesteria bloom, the authors estimated consumer surplus losses resulting from concerns about seafood safety at between $37 and $72 million in the mid-Atlantic region. An important further conclusion of this study was that public pronouncements assuring the safety of seafood may do little to reduce economic losses. Mandatory programs of seafood inspection appear to be more effective in protecting the public health and minimizing general consumer concerns about seafood quality.
The objectives of our study are twofold: (1) we aim to develop estimates of direct economic impacts of the 2005 event on commercial shellfish fisheries in Maine and Massachusetts using methods that are consistent with economic theory 2 ; and (2) we aim to identify broader effects of the event on market supply channels and prices using empirical data from the shellfish industry. Oceanographers have indicated that another significant
Alexandrium fundyense event will occur in the future due to the deposition of large quantities of algal cysts in New England ocean sediments (Anderson et al. 2005) . If this is true, then the results of our study should provide useful information for policy-and decision-makers and the public in managing these events and in obtaining a more accurate assessment of the economic impacts of HABs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents background information on the 2005 red tide event. Section 3 describes the methods for calculating lost shellfish landings and for identifying and testing key market links. Data sources and the results of impact calculations and model estimations are summarized in Section 4. Section 5 presents our conclusions.
Background
Alexandrium fundyense is a dinoflagellate that produces a toxin that may be concentrated in the tissues of shellfish as they filter seawater for food. The toxin may cause paralytic shellfish poisoning (PSP) in humans that eat the shellfish. Current management measures include toxicity testing of shellfish throughout the coastal region, and closures of shellfish beds when a toxicity threshold 3 is exceeded (Vakalopoulos et al. 2006) . and river runoff, including two or more "northeaster" storms that pushed waters onshore.
In addition, cysts were abundant in offshore sediments (Vakalopoulos et al. 2006 
Methods
A correct measure of HAB impact should be based on a comparison of two scenarios: with and without the HAB event. Suppose that the net economic benefit of an industry (Π) can be measured (e.g., net revenue from fishing). Let A and B refer to the net economic benefits with-and without-HABs; then the economic damage of a red tide event is the difference between these benefits (ΔΠ):
Here we examine changes in the value and quantity of shellfish landings with and without red tide. Π A represents the actual harvest value in 2005 and Π B is the baseline harvest value.
6 Because shellfish closures lead to harvest losses, ΔΠ should be strictly negative.
To develop a more rigorous analysis of the effects of HAB on quantity and value of shellfish landings and to identify broader market effects on shellfish supply channels and prices, we construct regression models using time series data for each of these variables separately. Let y be the dependent variable (e.g., harvest quantity or imports).
We model y as:
where α 0 through α 14 are coefficients and ε is an error term. M i is the dummy variable for month i, D is the dummy variable for red tide (e.g., D represents a three-month period from April to June), and t is time (i.e., year). Thus, changes in y reflect a combination of seasonal fluctuations, linear and nonlinear time trends, and the red tide event.
The concept of our analysis is essentially the same as an event study that measures the impact of a specific event on the value of a firm by comparing the "normal" and "abnormal" returns using financial market data (Knapp 1990; MacKinlay 1997; Salin and Hooker 2001) .
Data and Results
For our study, we compiled shellfish data from 1990 to 2005 from several sources, including value and quantity of landings of four shellfish species: quahog (i.e. hard shell clams), softshell clam, mussel, and oyster from the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS); shellfish landings data from the Massachusetts Division of Marine Fisheries; shellfish import data from the US Census Bureau; and wholesale price data from the New York Fulton Fish Market. While the import and wholesale price data are mostly complete, the landing statistics are of varying levels of completeness, depending on geographical location, time (i.e., year or month), and species.
Harvest Losses in Maine
NMFS data on monthly shellfish landings in Maine are mostly complete from 1990 to 2005, especially for softshell clams, the dominant species, and mussels. On average, the two species account for over 90% of annual total value of shellfish landings in Maine. As noted, the red tide impact on the shellfish industry is estimated by comparing the 2005 monthly quantity and value of landings with corresponding baseline quantity and value of non-HAB years.
Although the idea is straightforward, actual construction of the baseline is not. Table 1 ).
Annual variations in landings due to changes in species stocks and fishing effort may mask the losses due to the red tide event.
7 Similarly, observed reductions in catch during a HAB-period may be driven mostly by the annual variations. Table 2 . Strong seasonality in harvest levels is highlighted by the magnitude and statistically significant coefficients for May through August in both the quantity and value models. The red tide dummy (for April, May, and
June of 2005) is negative and significant in the quantity model. Although the negative sign for the coefficient of the red tide dummy is as expected, the coefficient is not statistically significant in the value model. This may be attributable to HAB-induced price changes, a point we will explore below in Section 4.4.
Harvest Losses in Massachusetts
Monthly shellfish landings data in Massachusetts are unavailable due to the state's "less-than-perfect" landing reporting system. 10 In our study, we combine annual harvest data from NMFS and the Massachusetts Division of Marine Fisheries (DMF).
7 Annual variations may also be caused by shellfish closures at isolated locations due to various small scale HABs, heavy rainfalls, and other pollution events. Localized closures may also be part of an overall management strategy. Because these events are relatively frequent and small in scale, they cannot be separated from the baseline with available data. 8 In the regressions, y = quantity of landings in millions of pounds and value of landings in millions of dollars, respectively (see Note 2 under Table 2 ).
9 Estimates of an autoregressive error model corrected for 3rd order autocorrelation. Specifically, the 1996-2000 data were from DMF and data for other years from NMFS.
As shown in Table 3 , data from the two sources appear consistent. Table   3 ). The most significant difference between the two baselines is the considerably higher level of mussel landings. Note that the NMFS records of mussel harvests in [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] are much larger than those in subsequent years (top of the column labeled Mussel in Table 3 ). This leads to a much greater impact estimate for mussels (Table 3 and Figure   6 ).
Using Massachusetts shellfish prices in 2005, we estimate the value of lost harvests. As shown in Table 4 
NMFS data for 1990-1994 include monthly mussel landings in some
Massachusetts counties, which enable us to calculate monthly shares. We construct a monthly mussel landing baseline using those monthly shares and the 1996-1999 annual average. As depicted in Figure 7 , the red tide caused noticeable declines in harvest from April to July with a nearly complete loss in June.
Imports to New England
To assess the broader market effects of the 2005 red tide event and to identify alternative market supply channels, we examine live and fresh shellfish imports to New
England from Canada using 1990-2005 data from the US Census Bureau. Specifically, we estimate equation (2) using imports as a dependent variable. 12 Results of separate estimations for quantity and value are summarized in Table 5 . The results indicate that the models fit the data well with R-squares above 0.9. Shellfish imports also exhibit strong seasonal cycles with higher levels in the summer and lower levels in January through March. Import quantities have been increasing since 1990.
As suggested by the positive and statistically significant coefficients for the red tide dummies in both the quantity and value models, the red tide event in 2005 probably led to an increase in imports to fill the supply-demand gap resulting from declines in local harvests. This implies that the indirect impacts of a HAB-event on the seafood industries (e.g., seafood retails and restaurants) may be partially offset by rising supplies from other market channels. Imports flow into the same processing and distribution channels as raw product, thereby ameliorating indirect and induced effects in these sectors. In other words, multipliers of 3.0 or 4.5, such as those used by the states of Maine and Massachusetts to estimate total impacts, may be excessive 13 . Market. An interesting finding is that the price was higher than normal during the early stages of the red tide event (May and June), possibly due to supply shortages from Maine, and lower than normal during the later stage of the event (August through October), possibly because of consumer concerns of seafood quality resulting from negative media publicity, as discussed by Wessells et al. (1995) and Whitehead et al. (2003) in their case studies. Another possible cause for the price drop is that when the New York market expected supply to be limited all summer, wholesalers switched to other sources or to other shellfish species to ensure stable supply.
Spatial and Temporal Price Effects
As a further analysis, we develop four price models with the same specification as equation (2), with the dependent variable y = softshell clam prices in Maine and New York, respectively. As shown in Table 6 , the dependent variables in Models A and B are
Maine ex-vessel softshell clam prices from the NMFS dealer data and the dependent variables in Models C and D are New York wholesale prices from the Fulton Fish 13 These multipliers may also be excessive because shellfish harvesting uses very low levels of purchased inputs and product flows from harvester to consumer with relatively little value added at either the wholesale or retail level.
Market. Results of all four models suggest strong seasonal cycles in softshell clam prices at both locations, with higher prices in summer (July, August, and September) and lower prices in spring (March, April, and May). Overall, prices have been declining since 1990, as indicated by the negative signs and statistically significant coefficients for the time trend (i.e., Year).
We used a dummy variable, Redtide York City. Generally, the results, particularly those of the Fulton models, suggest a temporal effect on softshell clam prices that may be a function of information dissemination: in the early stage of the red tide event, there was no significant reduction in shellfish demand; however, as the negative information about seafood quality disseminated among consumers, the reduction in demand became more evident. It is also likely that consumers switched to substitute seafoods from other supply sources.
Conclusions
Existing impact assessments of HAB events are often rough estimates based on limited observation or hypothetical events. In most cases, we do not have a good understanding of the economic effects of red tide events. From a management perspective, however, it is important to measure the scale of the economic costs to society of HAB events.
We develop estimates of direct economic impacts of the 2005 event on commercial shellfish fisheries in Maine and Massachusetts using methods that are consistent with economic theory and data from NMFS, DMF, and other sources. Our results indicate that the low-end estimate for total direct impacts in Maine was $2.4 million including lost revenues in the softshell clam and mussel fisheries. The total direct impacts on commercial shellfish industry in Massachusetts may be as high as $18 million. These estimates are actually larger than the estimate of direct harvest loss of $10.26 million reported in Hickey and Whittaker (2006) . However, because of serious data limitations, the estimated direct impact on Massachusetts harvesters should be viewed with caution.
To improve estimates of HAB impacts in Massachusetts, it will be essential to construct a baseline of monthly shellfish landings so that HAB impact assessments may focus on the relevant months. For the same reason, daily data would further improve the precision of our future estimates. We have shown that impact estimates are affected by baseline values of non-HAB years. An accurate impact estimate requires a relatively stable baseline using data from recent years.
We have identified two broader effects of the 2005 red tide event on shellfish market. First, the event led to an increase in shellfish imports to fill the supply-demand gap resulting from declines in local harvests. This implies that indirect impacts of a HAB-event on the seafood industries may be partially mitigated by rising supplies from alternative market channels. Second, we have shown that HAB impacts on softshell clam prices are spatially linked: the shellfish closures in Maine may result in price changes in New York. 11, 869, 284 9, 098, 770, 681 17, 225, 617 14, 186, 039, 456 21, 996, 722 19, 673, 323, 098 3, 723, 068 2, 623, 099, 721, 702 5, 634, 087, 201 11, 243, 910 9, 163, 080, 681 9, 789, 895 8, 923, 175 1, 557, 289 1, 165, 745 Note: All baselines are constructed by computing the average values for each month using data from 2000 to 2004. 1990 7,702,387 3,870,516 30,647,357 470,820 1991 7,518,091 5,628,854 31,547,353 498,921 1992 7,560,130 6,956,255 32,285,710 732,586 1993 8,249,135 6,609,711 10,095,052 636,149 1994 ----1995 ----1996 6,968,457 9,874,560 939,565 264,900 1997 6,208,406 11,548,440 941,710 721,150 1998 6,323,778 10,962,000 1,512,670 798,422 1999 7,597,341 7,174 ) 6,774,496 9,889,772 1,342,414 618,546 Change I -5,233,410 -7,431,170 -191,120 666,479 Average (1990 Notes: (1) All units are live weight in pounds.
(2) -data are incomplete or unavailable. Notes: (1) * , ** , and *** against the reported coefficients denote significance at 10, 5, 1% levels, respectively. Note: Since complete monthly mussel landing data are not available, the baseline is constructed in two steps. First, average monthly shares are estimates using partial mussel landing data from MNFS. Next, the shares are applied to the 1996-1999 annual average based on data from Massachusetts Division of Marine Fisheries (see Table 2 ). 2005 data are from NMFS. 
